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ABSTRACT 
In recent times, DNS tunneling techniques have been used for malicious purposes, however 
network security mechanisms struggle to detect them. Network forensic analysis has been proven 
effective, but is slow and effort intensive as Network Forensics Analysis Tools struggle to deal 
with undocumented or new network tunneling techniques. In this paper, we present a machine 
learning approach, based on feature subsets of network traffic evidence, to aid forensic analysis 
through automating the inference of protocols carried within DNS tunneling techniques. We 
explore four network protocols, namely, HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, and POP3. Three features are 
extracted from the DNS tunneled traffic: IP packet length, DNS Query Name Entropy, and DNS 
Query Name Length. We benchmark the performance of four classification models, i.e., decision 
trees, support vector machines, k-nearest neighbours, and neural networks, on a data set of DNS 
tunneled traffic. Classification accuracy of 95% is achieved and the feature set reduces the original 
evidence data size by a factor of 74%. More importantly, our findings provide strong evidence that 
predictive modeling machine learning techniques can be used to identify network protocols within 
DNS tunneled traffic in real-time with high accuracy from a relatively small-sized feature-set, 
without necessarily infringing on privacy from the outset, nor having to collect complete DNS 
Tunneling sessions. 
Keywords: Network Forensics, Machine Learning, Predictive Models, DNS Tunneling, Protocol 
Tunneling, Digital Investigations 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tunneling network traffic over the DNS 
protocol for malicious purposes has been on the 
increase in recent years. The Morto worm 
(Open DNS Inc, 2011), Feederbot (Dietrich et 
al., 2011), BerhardPOS (Valenzuela, 2015), 
FrameworkPOS (AlienVault Inc., 2016) and 
other similar malware variants evidence this 
recent rising trend of stealthy network 
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communication for malicious purposes ( Open 
DNS Inc, 2011). Such malicious activities 
include exfiltration of sensitive data, hiding 
network attacks and masking malware 
communication often among botnets (Xu, 
Butler, Saha, & Yao, 2013). The availability of 
several free tools for performing DNS tunneling 
(such as IoDine, NSTX, dnscat, DeNiSe, 
Heyoka and OzymanDNS) ( Omar Santos, 
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2015) has also contributed to the increasing 
use of this stealthy communication technique. 
Network security mechanisms have been 
built in an attempt to detect or prevent this 
problem. Preventive measures such as firewalls 
have been seen to be inadequate (Valenzuela, 
2015). Detection mechanisms such as (Born & 
Gustafson, 2010) (Farnham, 2013) and (Hands, 
Yang, & Hansen, 2015) have also been 
implemented; however, they also fall short, 
mitigating only 3% of incidents among 
sophisticated real world attacks (Valenzuela, 
2015). Reactive methods, such as network 
security monitoring and network forensics offer 
some respite; however, they result in the 
collection of large amounts of data. Firstly, 
this bulk collection of network traffic data, 
presents a problem of storage resources and 
data privacy. Additionally, in order to uncover 
malicious activity, this bulky data needs to be 
analyzed in an investigative process, which is 
manual, effort intensive and requires skilled 
expertise (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). Current 
industry standard network forensics analysis 
tools only parse standardized network 
protocols, and are not capable of dealing with 
undocumented, or previously unseen network 
protocols, thus resulting in manual analysis 
and custom scripts being developed on a case 
by case basis. All in all, this analysis, discovery 
and reconstruction process is time-consuming 
and has been seen to take around 7 months to 
uncover malicious activity (Mandiant, 2015). 
Innovative methods are needed to address 
these combined challenges of storage space, 
data privacy, and effort-intensive, time-
consuming manual analysis. To this end, we 
explore the extent to which machine learning 
techniques can be applied on smaller-sized, less 
privacy intrusive feature-sets of DNS tunneling 
traffic in order to uncover insights that can 
contribute to network forensic investigations. 
In the network forensic analysis of tunneled 
network traffic, it is imperative to identify the 
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carrier tunneling protocol, the internally 
tunneled network protocol, the communicating 
parties, the content being communicated and 
its significance. Among large amounts of 
network traffic, it is a challenging task to 
uncover all these artifacts of interest. Within 
our scope of DNS tunneling, we assume that 
the identification of the carrier tunneling 
protocol can be achieved with the DNS 
tunneling detection techniques seen in (Born & 
Gustafson, 2010) and (Farnham, 2013). We 
thus focus on the next step of discovering the 
network protocol that is being carried 
internally within the DNS tunnel. To the best 
of our knowledge there is only one other study 
(Homem, Papapetrou, & Dosis, 2016) that 
focuses on the discovery of network protocols 
within DNS tunnels for forensic purposes. It 
focuses on the prediction of only 2 internally 
tunneled protocols (HTTP and FTP) and 
makes use of a single entropy-based pattern 
matching technique. Though an indicative 
result of a 75% prediction accuracy is achieved 
in that study, the dataset of 20 samples that it 
is tested on is rather small. 
Most currently available DNS tunneling 
tools and techniques only employ encoding and 
compression in their implementations, omitting 
encryption for throughput and efficiency 
reasons. This is due to the limited payload 
length available in the DNS field ( Query 
Name) where the tunneled traffic is usually 
carried. As such, for our study at hand, it is 
worth noting that we do not focus on 
identifying protocols within encrypted tunnels, 
but rather we focus on identifying network 
protocols that are compressed and encoded in 
otherwise exotic, non-standard or 
undocumented techniques within DNS tunnels. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
Novelty: We identify and demonstrate 
how well-established predictive modeling 
machine learning techniques can be harnessed 
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for the identification of the internally carried 
protocols within DNS tunnels in order to aid 
the triage and analysis processes in digital 
investigations. More concretely, we extend on 
prior work (Homem et al. , 2016), by using 4 
predictive modeling techniques (k-Nearest 
Neighbours (k-NN), Decision Trees, Support 
Vector Machines (SVMs), and Neural 
Networks) on a larger DNS tunneling traffic 
data set of 1. 7GB, containing 211 network 
traffic samples. Compared to prior work, 
(Homem et al., 2016) we also expand our 
prediction task to 4 protocols (HTTP, HTTPS, 
FTP, and POP3) , and explore a wider set of 
features derived from a larger 1.7GB DNS 
tunneling traffic data set. The specific features 
are the DNS Query Name Entropy, the DNS 
Query Name Length, and the carrier IP Packet 
Length. 
Effectiveness and Improved 
Performance: From our results, it is seen 
that our approach achieves a significant 
improvement m predictive performance 
compared to the state-of-the-art, with Neural 
Networks achieving the highest accuracy of 
95 % and 5-NN the lowest accuracy of 90%. 
The 3-parameter feature-set, derived from the 
original raw network traffic data, also reduces 
the size of the dataset from 1.7GB to 436MB, 
effectively providing a reduction of 74% in the 
storage space required. 
Applicability: Our findings indicate that 
certain predictive modelling techniques, from 
the area of machine learning, can be used to 
identify network protocols carried within DNS 
tunneled traffic. These allow for automated 
prediction in real-time with high accuracy from 
a relatively small-sized set of features, without 
necessarily infringing on privacy from the 
outset, nor necessarily having to collect 
complete DNS tunneling sessions. 
As a result of these insights from our work, 
the effort of a network forensic analyst may be 
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reduced in that particular network protocols of 
interest to an investigation can be identified 
quickly in an automated manner - without the 
need for effort intensive, time consuming 
manual reconstruction and discovery. 
Essentially, this can be used to automate data 
reduction, as part of the triage phase (Rogers, 
Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006) 
(Casey, 2013) (Marturana & Tacconi, 2013), or 
the initial parts of the analysis phase of a 
digital investigation. The aim of this is to 
narrow down a large set of network traffic 
evidence into the particular DNS tunneled 
network traffic samples that contain the 
specific network protocol of interest being 
tunneled. Furthermore, privacy is preserved at 
the initial stages, since only the chosen set of 
features is used to identify DNS tunneled 
traffic evidence samples of potential interest , as 
opposed to manual reconstruction, which is 
fundamentally invasive. 
The rest of this paper is organized as 
follows: In the following section (Section 2), we 
explore related work. Section 3 explains the 
details of our proposed method. The results 
from the experimental evaluation are shown 
and discussed in Section 4. Finally, in Sections 
5 and 6 we present our conclusions and future 
work, respectively. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Studies aimed at classifying protocols within 
network tunnels have mostly focused on 
HTTP, SSH and SSL tunnels. In (Bernaille & 
Teixeira, 2007) , the sizes of the first few 
packets in an SSL session were subjected to a 
clustering mechanism using Gaussian mixture 
models to distinguish between when HTTP, 
FTP, BitTorrent, eDonkey, SMTP or POP3 
were being tunneled. Packet sizes, inter-arrival 
times and packet arrival order were 
statistically analyzed in ( Crotti, Dusi , Gringoli, 
& Salgarelli, 2007) to distinguish between 
normal HTTP traffic and when other protocols 
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were being tunneled over HTTP. The same 
authors extended their work to distinguish 
normal SSH and HTTP traffic from SSH and 
HTTP Tunnels, respectively, as well as to 
identify which sessions contained HTTP, 
POP3, Chat and P2P protocols within the 
respective tunnels (Dusi, Crotti, Gringoli, & 
Salgarelli, 2009). Adaboost, C4.5 Decision 
Trees, and Genetic Programming based 
classifiers were used in (Alshammari & Zincir-
Heywood, 2011) to distinguish Skype and SSH 
traffic from other traffic, as well as to identify 
the type of application traffic (Shell, SFTP, 
SCP, Local / Remote Forwarding or Xl 1) being 
tunneled in the SSH tunnel. In (Song, Wagner, 
& Tian, 2001) an attempt at inferring 
keystrokes from SSH shell session traffic, is 
made using Hidden Markov Models on packet 
timing characteristics. 
Outside the realm of network tunneling, 
notably in (Hjelmvik & John, 2010), 
identification of proprietary and obfuscated 
protocols ( such as Skype and Spotify) was 
done using the Kullback-Leibler divergence on 
various subsets of a 34 attribute feature-set. 
Among DNS tunneling techniques, so far, 
the focus has been on detecting the presence of 
DNS tunneling among network traffic. Such 
detection techniques are seen in (Born & 
Gustafson, 2010), (Farnham, 2013), (Xu et al., 
2013) and (Ellens et al., 2013). Work on the 
discovery of the network protocols carried 
within DNS tunnels has only recently begun, 
starting with manual deconstruction and 
discovery of network protocols within DNS 
tunnels, as is explained in (Davidoff & Ham, 
2012). Automated discovery of the protocols 
being tunneled within, has largely been 
unexplored except for a single study (Homem 
et al., 2016), that uses a pattern matching 
technique ( termed as M eanDiff) on a single 
feature (packet entropy) to predict the 
presence of HTTP and FTP traffic within DNS 
tunnels. With this aforementioned study being 
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the state of the art, we expand on it by using 
additional features and by exploring more 
robust, well-established predictive modeling 
machine learning techniques (k-Nearest 
Neighbours, Decision Trees, SVMs and Neural 
Networks) to improve the classification process 
on a wider array of network protocols. 
Our study aims to harness well-established 
machine learning techniques to improve the 
automated discovery of network protocols 
hidden within DNS tunnels. This is done in 
order to reduce the burden on forensic 
investigators when faced with the task of 
analyzing large amounts of network traffic. 
When put into to practice, the techniques 
shown in this study, serve as a quick 
automated triage solution for narrowing down 
and identifying traffic that may contain 
particular protocols of interest that may 
require deeper analysis. This helps forensic 
investigators quickly focus their efforts on 
pieces of network traffic evidence that have a 
higher likelihood of being significant, while 
excluding those that have a low likelihood of 
containing the particular network protocol of 
concern. 
3. lVIETHOD 
In brief, our proposed approach entails 
extracting only a subset of features (metadata) 
from DNS tunneling traffic, and feeding this 
subset of features into a given predictive 
modeling technique to train it. Once training is 
complete, given any subsequent DNS tunneling 
traffic sample, the subset of features is 
extracted, fed into the trained model, which 
then identifies the network protocol within the 
given tunneling sequence. 
Given a DNS tunneling network traffic 
sample, the specific features (metadata) that 
we extract are: the IP Packet Length, the DNS 
Query Name Length and the DNS Query Name 
Entropy. The choice of using "lengths" of 
certain packet fields as features is inspired 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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through their prior usage in other similar 
works, such as (Dusi et al. , 2009) and 
(Alshammari & Zincir-Heywood, 2011). The 
motivation for using the entropy of the DNS 
Query Name originates from the importance of 
this field in manual reconstruction of DNS 
tunneling traffic (Davidoff & Ham, 2012) as 
well as its usefulness in protocol prediction 
seen in (Homem et al. , 2016). Entropy has also 
been seen as an indicative numeric quantity in 
identifying the contents of otherwise human, 
non-readable content as is particularly seen in 
the detection of DNS tunneling in (Xu et al., 
2013) and (Dietrich et al., 2011). Additionally, 
these numeric features individually do not 
uncover any personally identifiable information 
contained within the network data traffic per 
se, thereby promoting privacy to a certain 
extent. 
Once the 3 chosen features (metadata) are 
extracted from the raw DNS tunneled traffic, 
each DNS tunneling sample is now 
characterized by a small 3-parameter (feature) 
representation, rather than the original bulky 
DNS Tunneling PCAP Files 
+ + + 
Feature Engineering 
network traffic capture. This 3-parameter 
representation could then be fed directly into a 
predictive model for training or prediction. 
We chose four commonly used predictive 
modeling techniques for our study, specifically: 
k-Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) (Batista, Wang, 
& Keogh, 2011), Decision Trees (Rodriguez & 
Alonso, 2004), Support Vector Machines 
(SVMs) (Wu & Chang, 2004), and Neural 
Networks (Nanopoulos, Alcock, & 
Manolopoulos, 2001). These four techniques 
have shown prom1smg and competitive 
performance within the area of network 
protocol identification. For example, decision 
trees (Li & Moore, 2007) and support vector 
machines ( Jing, Yang, Cheng, Dong, & Xiong, 
2011) accurately classify internet traffic using a 
small set of traffic features, while neural 
networks have shown competitive performance 
in predicting network traffic without access to 
the contents of packets, against methods 
requiring full packet payloads for classification 
(Auld, Moore, & Gull, 2007). 
Protocol Prediction 
r-------------------------1 
I 
1
~:! DNS Tunneling l 
101 100 PCAP Files : 
(Test set) 1 
I 
I 
I 
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, Results : 
I '-----~ I 1 ________________________ I 
Figure 1. Method used for Developing and Testing Predictive Models for Network Protocol Prediction in DNS 
Tunnels 
In summary, our approach follows three 
main steps as described below and depicted in 
Figure 1: 
1. Feature Engineering: 
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Given a set of DNS tunneling traffic 
packet captures (sequences), our 
technique extracts the IP Packet 
Length, the DNS Query Name Length 
Page 83
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and calculates the Entropy of the DNS 
Query Name of each packet in the 
sequence of DNS tunneling packets. 
The average value of each feature is 
then calculated across a given packet 
capture sequence. This serves as the 3-
parameter identifier summarizing a 
given DNS tunneling sequence, whose 
original structure could potentially 
have contained tens of thousands of 
packets making up the entire session, or 
much of a larger part of it. 
2. Model Construction: 
Using the extracted features, a 
predictive model is generated through a 
training phase performed using either 
one of the aforementioned machine 
learning techniques . 
3. Protocol Prediction: 
Given a new DNS tunneling traffic 
capture sequence, the three features are 
extracted on-the-fly, eliciting a 3-
parameter identifier for this traffic 
capture sequence. The trained 
predictive model is applied on this, 
resulting in a class prediction, 
corresponding to the underlying 
tunneled protocol. In essence, the 
model compares the characteristics of 
the given 3-parameter identifier to its 
internal model criteria and chooses 
which class the identifier in question 
belongs to. 
One of the main benefits of this technique 
is the significant reduction of the size of the 
actual packet capture sequences to a single 3-
parameter identifier containing 3 numeric 
values. The other significant benefit is that 
once the training phase of the classification 
model is completed, the classification process 
for multiple tunneling instances can be done in 
real-time. Additionally, since many machine 
learning predictive models are adaptive, the 
feedback of a new, previously unseen instance 
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can help train the model for classification of 
future instances. However, training need not be 
done for each new instance, it can be 
performed in a batch process outside the 
classification procedure. This would allow for 
on-demand instantaneous classification. 
4. EXPERilVlENTAL 
EVALUATION 
In order to implement and test our 
approach, a dataset of DNS tunneling traffic 
samples was collected and scripts written in 
Python and the R statistical programming 
language. 
4.1 D ataset Collection 
As there are no easily available real-world DNS 
tunneling labelled datasets (Stevanovic, 
Pedersen, D'Alconzo, Ruehrup, & Berger, 
2015) , due to their potentially sensitive nature, 
we had to create our own. Scripts were written 
in Python to generate and collect packet 
captures of network traffic simulating normal 
use of a set of network protocols running over 
DNS Tunnels. The DNS tunneling tool that 
was used to enable the tunneling process for 
our purposes was IoDine (Ekman & Andersson, 
2009). It was chosen due to its relative 
popularity, readily available source code, and 
its ease of setup and use. 
The network protocols that were chosen to 
run within the DNS tunnels were HTTP, FTP, 
HTTPS, and POP3. The reason for using these 
protocols was that they have also been the 
candidate protocols in similar prior works such 
as (Bernaille & Teixeira, 2007) and (Dusi et 
al., 2009). Additionally, it helps us benchmark 
HTTP and FTP discovery in DNS tunnels of 
our technique against that seen in (Homem et 
al., 2016), further expanding the body of 
knowledge. POP3 and FTP are similarly terse 
protocols in their vocabulary, and thus could 
likely be mixed up with the technique in 
(Homem et al. , 2016), while HTTP and 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
  
 
                                                          
 
  
Harnessing Predictive Models for Assisting Network ... CDFSL Proceedings 2017 
HTTPS are a similar family of protocols 
performing a similar task and could thus also 
be easily mixed up in protocol prediction. An 
extra bonus of using HTTPS was to see how 
the tool would perform in the face of a 
protocol that makes use of encryption. 
The individual network protocols were 
simulated in such a way to mimic normal 
usage. HTTP and HTTPS protocol traffic data 
was generated by visiting 5 random websites 
sequentially. FTP was simulated through the 
directory traversal and downloading of 5 
random files from an FTP server. POP3 
network traffic was generated through 
requesting and downloading 5 random emails 
from a mail server, where some emails 
Table 1 
Distribution of the Protocols Tunneled over DNS 
Network Protocol # of Samples 
HTTP 52 
HTTPS 53 
FTP 53 
POP3 53 
Total 211 
The Python scripts used for performing the 
feature extraction are available online in a 
Github Repository1. The reduced size feature 
set is also made available online 2 for 
comparison and verification purposes. 
4.2 Setup 
Using the R statistical programming language , 
we applied four machine learning predictive 
modeling techniques on our reduced data set. 
These were: k-Nearest Neighbours, Decision 
Trees using the CART algorithm, SVM's using 
a Radial Kernel function , and Multinomial 
Neural Networks. 
1https: //github.com/ irvinhomem/ TunnelFeatureEx 
tractor
2 https: //dx.doi.org/ 10.17045/ sthlmuni.4229399.vl
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contained plain text and others contained 
randomly generated files as attachments. 
The dataset itself comprises 211 packet 
captures containing DNS tunneling traffic. 
There were 53 samples of HTTPS, POP3, and 
FTP respectively, while HTTP contained 52. 
Table 1 summarizes the distribution of the 
samples. The aim was to have an almost equal 
distribution of the network protocols within 
the dataset. The size of the entire data set was 
1.7GB; however, after the process of feature 
extraction, this was reduced to about 436MB. 
The feature extraction is performed through 
scripts that collect the aforementioned features 
from each packet capture sample and store 
them in JSON files - one file for each packet 
capture sample. 
Original Size Reduced Size 
636.7 MB 176.9 MB 
686.3 MB 181.4 MB 
260.2 MB 49.8 MB 
131.6 MB 28.2 MB 
1714.8 MB 436.3 MB 
In order to ensure non-biased training of 
the models using these algorithms we employed 
a 5-round repeated 10-fold cross-validation. 
That is, the data set was split into 10 subsets -
respecting class distributions within each 
subset - and 9 out of 10 of the subsets were 
used in training the models, while the other 
single subset was used for testing the classifier 
model's performance. This is done for each 
subset, leaving the other 9 out of 10 for 
training. This procedure is repeated with 5 
different rounds of selection for the candidates 
of each subset. In this way over-fitting is 
reduced. 
Each machine learning classification 
algorithm has several of its own tuning 
parameters used to improve the classification 
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accuracy. For example, for the Nearest 
Neighbours classifier, k is one of the tuning 
parameters, while for Decision Trees it is the 
split criterion and threshold of each feature, 
their order and the tree depth. SVMs and 
Neural networks have numerous parameters 
mainly related to feature weights and cost-
functions, which cannot be explained here in 
detail due to space limitations. 
The tuning parameters for each algorithm 
were explored via the versatility and 
automated tuning facilities of the caret library 
(Kuhn, 2013) available within R. To limit the 
scope of this study we mainly focused on 
collecting the tuning parameters that produced 
the best results for each machine learning 
technique, that is, those that resulted in the 
highest classification accuracy. We also noted 
the corresponding precision and recall values 
in order to benchmark the performance of our 
proposed three-feature method using the four 
predictive modeling techniques, against the 
competitor method MeanDiff that used a single 
feature as proposed in (Homem et al. , 2016). 
The M eanDiff method was run against the 
same conditions as our proposed method with 
our data set for the comparison of the 
performance metrics. 
Page 2 
4. 3 Results & DisctisBion 
For k-Nearest Neighbours, several values of k 
were tested. The best accuracy for this model 
was achieved with 5 nearest neighbours. Figure 
2 depicts the accuracy of different values of k 
and shows a peak accuracy of close to 90% 
with 5 nearest neighbours. With Decision 
Trees, the split criteria and their thresholds 
were varied to adjust for best classification 
accuracy. Figure 3 depicts the features and 
their thresholds that resulted in the decision 
tree with the highest accuracy of about 92%. 
For the SVM classification model, the highest 
accuracy was achieved with a Gaussian Radial 
basis function with the Sigma hyper-parameter 
set to 2.33809, a cost value of 1, and 86 
support vectors. For the Neural Networks 
model, a Penalized Multinomial Regression 
function was used with a decay factor of zero. 
The resulting performance measures of 
prec1s1on, recall, and accuracy for the 
prediction of the four candidate protocols using 
the above models are summarized in Table 2, 
averaged over the five rounds of cross-
validation. The performance measures serve as 
a benchmark to evaluate the viability of our 
technique. 
@ 2017 ADFSL 
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Figure 2. Accuracy of k-Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) with varying k values 
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P age 3
 ADFSL Conference Proceedings 2017 Harnessing Predictive Models for Assisting Network ... 
Table 2 
Combined Per formance Metrics o• the four chosen Predictive Models against the competitor MeanD~ff 
Decision Trees SVM Multinomial Classifiers 5-NN (CART) (Radial Kerne l) N eura l N etwork MeanDiff 
.:: >, .:: >, .:: 
etrics 0 (.) 0 ..... (.) 0 
·en "@ ell ·en "@ ell ·en (%) ,.... ,.... ·a (.) ;j ·a (.) ;j ·a 
(!) ~ (.) (!) ~ (.) (!) ,.... (.) ,.... (.) ,.... 
0-; ~ 0-; ~ 0-; 
Protocols 
HTTP 84 80 88 81 84 
FTP 100 100 100 98 100 
90% 92% 
HTTPS 78 84 82 88 
POP3 98 95 96 100 
In summary, we observe that Neural 
Networks provide t he highest accuracy of 95% 
and 5-NN the lowest accuracy of 90%. 
Furthermore, all the 4 chosen machine learning 
methods tested in this study achieve a 
prediction accuracy of at least 90%. Precision 
and Recall metrics for all algorithms are at 
least 78% and above, with a majority being 
over 85%. On average, t he Multinomial Neural 
Network classifier produced the highest 
precision and recall when compared to all t he 
other classifier algorithms. The competitor 
method MeanDiff, despite the high recall 
( 100%) for HTTP and FTP, seems rather poor 
(precision and recall of 0%) in distinguishing 
protocols of similar nature, i.e., HTTPS and 
POP3, respectively. 
The high performance of multinomial 
neural networks may be attributed to the 
flexibility of neural networks. However, this 
comes at the cost of interpretability of the 
model, as it is known to be difficult to 
deconstruct and understand the cost functions 
and weight assignments in developing such 
models. SVMs suffer from this similar 
drawback; however, k-NN and Decision Trees 
produce more interpretable models as depicted 
in Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
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Among the results of our experiments, it 
should also be noted t hat t he proposed 
method, making use of only the 3-parameter 
features-set, reduced the original dataset size 
from 1.7GB to 436MB. This constitutes a 
substantial reduction (by 74%) of the required 
storage space, and by extension the amount of 
data that needs to be processed. 
Given the time-pressures, labour intensity, 
scarcity of manpower and large amounts of 
evidence to be sifted through in typical cases 
today, it can be seen that a trade-off may be 
made based on the accuracy and data 
reduction capacity of our method in order to 
attain the benefits of saving time, money and 
labour. A forensic analyst may initially use our 
proposed method using Multinomial Neural 
Networks to achieve 95% accuracy of finding a 
particular protocol within a DNS t unnel 
instantaneously, as part of an automated triage 
process, rather than spend long hours manually 
reconstructing every network session of an 
undocumented DNS tunneling technique. Also 
with the significant space saving of about 74%, 
costs of storage space and computing 
processing power may also be saved by 
extension. Also, since the feature set of the 
evidence is smaller, processing and data 
transfer times naturally should also be faster 
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on the feature set as opposed to the larger 
original evidence data set. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we proposed the idea of using 
predictive modeling machine learning 
algorithms as a means to assist in the process 
of network forensic investigations of DNS 
tunnels . More specifically, we presented a 
method to predict network protocols carried 
within DNS tunnels, using only a small subset 
of metadata of the actual network traffic 
evidence. The aim of this is to assist network 
forensic practitioners in the early phases of an 
investigation to quickly triage and identify 
particular DNS tunneling traffic samples that 
are more likely to contain certain network 
protocols of interest to an investigation, and 
discard others without having to manually 
reconstruct and dissect all the packets . In this 
way, they can narrow down the evidence data 
set in an automated manner in order to focus 
their analysis efforts. 
To this end, we developed a method that 
extracts metadata (features) from DNS 
tunneling traffic samples, feeding only these 
features into machine learning algorithms, to 
predict the network protocol contained within 
a specific DNS tunneling traffic sample. This 
method was evaluated using 4 well established 
machine learning algorithms, and their 
performance benchmarked against the state-of-
the art. 
The results showed that our technique can 
predict network protocols within DNS 
tunneling traffic with an accuracy of between 
90-95% and with Precision and Recall values 
generally above 80%. This indicates 
significantly positive results with our 3-feature 
metadata subset and a markedly improved 
performance against the state-of-the art. Thus, 
using our technique an investigator can be 
directed in an automated manner with high 
certainty towards focusing their investigative 
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efforts on a smaller subset that is more likely 
to yield results. 
Another benefit of our technique is that it 
can also identify network protocols within DNS 
tunnels without the need to collect complete 
DNS tunneling sessions, as is the case with 
manual reconstruction via decoding and 
decompression. Furthermore, storage and 
processing power may be saved in using the 
smaller feature set that is shown to take up 
7 4 % less space than the original network traffic 
evidence set. 
Our technique also affords an amount of 
privacy as the network protocol identification 
technique is performed on numeric metadata 
which does not expose personally identifiable 
information, per se. 
6. FUTUREWORK 
Though the results of this study are 
significantly positive, there still remain 
improvements that can be made. For one, the 
use of different feature sets from the tunneled 
data can be considered. We manually selected 
the chosen features based on prior knowledge 
of their importance, with the indication of 
manual feature selection being common in 
related work. Automated feature selection 
techniques can also be studied as a future 
research direction, if a reasonably large feature 
set can be realized. There are possibly other 
features that may improve the classification 
performance. The application of alternative 
machine learning techniques, such as random 
forests, can also be considered as an avenue of 
future work that may improve the overall 
prediction performance. 
As earlier mentioned, the next step in a 
network forensic investigation would be to 
identify the content being transmitted by the 
protocols within the DNS tunnel. A feature 
( metadata )-based prediction mechanism to 
identify specific DNS Tunneling traffic samples 
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with particular types of content could also be 
explored as a natural progression for future 
work from this study. 
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